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Abstract 
 
Adopted on November 2016, the Multilateral instrument for BEPS tax treaty measures (MLI) has 
come into play in the global tax treaty landscape. The MLI is a multilateral agreement that aims 
for a speedy implementation of the treaty measures agreed upon in the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Project by allowing the modification of the bilateral double tax treaties (DTTs) 
without the need of individual negotiation of each treaty. In other words, it is a mass renegotiation 
of a 3000+ existing tax treaty network. In the following years, States enforcing the MLI will be 
confronted with new interpretative challenges arising from the interaction between both 
instruments, new taxation rules and different context. This investigation, focusing on the complex 
reservations system and compatibility clauses implemented by the MLI, provides a response on 
how the text of DTTs is actually modified by the MLI and its consequences on interpretation of 
DTTs in general.  
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Art.   Article 
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UN   United Nations 
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USCIB  United States Council for International Business 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Tax law needs to be understandable and transparent to every user. For this reason, elegance, brevity 
and clarity of expression are to be sought in the drafting of tax legislation, including tax treaties.1 
When these traits are met in the drafting process, the outcome should be one that is understandable 
to any person that wishes to be the subject of benefits granted by the tax treaty. Simultaneously, 
the purpose of the treaty should be clear from its preamble to discern the rationale of the rules.  
 
Adopted on 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Instrument for BEPS tax treaty measures (MLI) 
is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) device to implement 
a new world post base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).2 It is a multilateral treaty whose 
objective is to bring together the world to apply a series of changes in their bilateral double tax 
treaty (DTT) network. The purpose of the MLI, as stated in its preamble, is to be a mechanism that 
will implement in a synchronized and efficient manner, the treaty-related BEPS measures against 
tax avoidance and evasion across the existing DTTs without the need to renegotiate each 
agreement.3 In a nutshell, the MLI will coexist with the previously signed DTTs and will be 
implemented simultaneously. Pistone, an authority in international taxation, states that ‘this project 
has the potential of turning into the apex of a complex system of true multilateralism in 
international tax law, bringing legal pluralism in line with a worldwide coordination in the exercise 
of taxing sovereignties across national borders’.4 
 
Currently, Contracting States address two legal systems when solving international tax issues: their 
domestic law and DTT law. These legal systems must be regarded as autonomous with respect to 
each other which may lead to contrasting outcomes.5 For example, in a hybrid mismatch 
arrangement, State A and State B may have different qualifications in their domestic laws for an 
item of income. Also, as a result of these qualifications, the rules in their DTT may exempt or 
exclude the item from taxation. Consequently, the item of income is not taxed in any country 
meaning there is a case of double non-taxation. This outcome is not averse to the overall purpose 
of DTTs – the avoidance of double taxation.6 This situation is turned around with the entry into 
effect of the MLI. Article 5 of the MLI adjusts the DTT rules granting the exemption or exclusion 
from taxation to a credit method as in a ‘switch-over’ clause to avoid a situation of double non-
                                                          
1 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Law Design And Drafting (1st edn, IMF 1998), 74 
2 OECD, 'Action 15: A Mandate For The Development Of A Multilateral Instrument On Tax Treaty Measures To 
Tackle BEPS - Final Report' (OECD 2015), 15 
3 OECD, 'Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent BEPS' (OECD 2016), 1.  
4 Pasquale Pistone, 'Coordinating The Action Of Regional And Global Players During The Shif From Bilateralism To 
Multilateralism In International Tax Law' [2014] World Tax Journal, 9.  
5 M. Lang, 4. The interpretation of double taxation conventions in Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation 
Conventions (Second Revised Edition) (IBFD 2013), Online Books IBFD, 2-3. 
6 ibid 3.  
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taxation.7 Therefore, the MLI supplements the existing DTTs, not the domestic legislation, for the 
sake of combatting tax planning strategies that exploit mismatches in tax rules.  
 
As seen in the previous example, the incorporation of the MLI to the global tax treaty landscape 
may create legal uncertainty for national courts, legislators and taxpayers. National courts will find 
difficulties on interpreting and applying provisions in the MLI in conjunction with rules in DTTs 
and domestic law. Legislators will disagree on the status of the MLI in their national legal order 
whether they follow a monistic or dualistic view on the relationship between international 
agreements and domestic legislation. Moreover, the taxpayers’ rights will be affected by the impact 
of the MLI provisions to the claim of tax treaty benefits. 
 
For the success of the MLI, the OECD relies on the use of a complex system of reservations and 
compatibility clauses. These mechanisms introduce an unusual situation in the world of 
international tax law but not so uncommon in the universe of international public law. Multilateral 
treaties, such as the Agreement on Extradition between the European Union (EU) and the United 
States of America (USA)8, provides examples of compatibility clauses providing rules for the 
application of the multilateral treaty in regard of bilateral treaties. However, opposite to 
extradition, most countries have adverse interests when it comes to tax law and its interpretation 
because it has a significant impact on a sensible matter - their tax revenue.  
 
The way in which the reservations and compatibility provisions cover DTTs is crucial for the 
culmination of the BEPS Project. Great effort has been made by the OECD Member States and 
other members of the ad-hoc Group9 to arrange clauses suitable to existing DTTs whether they 
follow the OECD or the United Nations (UN) Model Convention. It is a hit or miss situation for 
the OECD. If these provisions fail to be implemented correctly in the MLI, then a popular phrase 
may come to one’s mind: ‘What works for you may not work for me’.  
 
1.2. Subject and Purpose 
 
In the light of the disclosure of the text of the MLI and its explanatory statement in November 
2016, times of uncertainty are coming. Academics have begun exploring the possible interpretative 
challenges that will be encountered in the swift implementation of the BEPS Project on DTTs 
through a complex multilateral convention. As Schwartz asserts, ‘the BEPS Convention matrix 
raises an additional new task for the next few years, that is trying to decide what the text of a 
                                                          
7 OECD (N 3) 5-7. 
8 'Agreement On Extradition Between The European Union And The United States Of America' (2003) L 181, 
19/07/2003 Official Journal of the European Union. 
9 The ad-hoc Group is a group of over 96 countries, including non-OECD countries, that was set up to develop the 
Multilateral Instrument through a series of negotiations starting on the 5th of November 2015. 
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specific treaty is as amended by the BEPS Convention’.10 Therefore, the subject is aimed to 
examine in which ways will the complex system of reservations and compatibility clauses in the 
MLI transform the text of DTTs.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to overcome new interpretative challenges arising from the MLI by 
providing a detailed analysis on how the text of a DTT is actually modified by the MLI and its 
consequences on interpreting DTTs. A successful analysis would signify a step forward towards 
the creation of consolidated texts combining the MLI and existing DTT provisions. This 
examination would ease the implementation process of the MLI in every jurisdiction.  
 
1.3. Method and Materials 
 
This paper will follow the traditional legal dogmatic approach from an international law 
perspective. A systematic analysis of the provisions of the MLI, with the aid of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), is conducted in this research. Other sources of law, 
such as international conventions and DTTs, contribute to the development of an internal 
perspective of the MLI. Soft law, specially the OECD materials on Action 15, plays an important 
role as it provides detailed explanations on the reasoning behind the subject under review. 
 
Furthermore, scholarly articles and academic research provide valuable theoretical knowledge in 
relation to this paper. It is acknowledged in the tax community that interpretation of tax treaties is 
moving towards multilateralism. As a result, several researchers have contributed with accurate 
opinions on the interpretative challenges of the MLI. The author has compiled and analyzed these 
materials as of May 2017.  
 
1.4. Delimitation 
 
Even if deriving issues originating from the interpretation of the MLI provisions are commented, 
the detailed meaning of these provisions and their effectiveness on the combat against profit 
shifting and aggressive tax planning are not the focus of this thesis. The author does not assess on 
the correctness of the treaty-related BEPS measures. Instead, the author analyzes how these 
measures amend the text of DTTs. In addition, provisions on dispute resolution mechanisms in the 
MLI are not observed as they have a bearing on practicality concerning procedural rules.  
 
Although the author pursues a semantic analysis of the MLI, the impact of this multilateral 
instrument on DTTs authenticated in official languages different to the authoritative languages of 
the MLI may not be examined thoroughly until national courts and tribunals establish case law on 
this topic or States apply unofficial translations of the MLI. Therefore, this thesis presents a limited 
                                                          
10 Jonathan Schwarz, BEPS Multilateral Convention Unveiled, Kluwer Intl. Tax Blog (25 Nov. 2016), available at 
http://kluwertaxblog.com/2016/11/25/beps-multilateral-convention-unveiled (accessed 5 May 2017). 
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approach to multilingual tax treaties, focusing on the relation between the English version of the 
MLI with the English versions of DTTs as it has been estimated that in total over 80% of tax 
treaties have an English version.11 
 
Also, only the relationship between the MLI and the existing DTTs is examined in this paper. The 
interaction between DTTs and domestic legislation has been widely discussed by several authors. 
Nonetheless, it is encouraged for researchers to continue this investigation by analyzing any 
interpretation effects of the MLI on national law.  
 
1.5. Outline 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter, the author illustrates an 
overview of the MLI, its legal nature and the different interpretative challenges arising from its 
implementation. Chapters 3 and 4 examine in depth the impact of reservations and compatibility 
clauses in the interpretation of the MLI and its relationship with existing DTTs. In Chapter 5, the 
author analyzes the need for a common interpretation of the MLI. Finally, Chapter 6 provides 
concluding remarks on the findings of this research.  
 
2. The Multilateral Instrument (MLI) 
 
2.1. General Remarks 
 
The MLI is an unusual multilateral agreement better considered as ‘a mass renegotiation of 
bilateral treaties on a limited range of issues and limited to a series of predetermined options’.12 
The MLI is an innovative treaty that aims for a speedy implementation of the treaty measures 
agreed upon in the BEPS Project by allowing the modification of bilateral tax treaties without the 
need for individual negotiation of each treaty. In a world with a 3000+ existing tax treaty network, 
the MLI seems as the only way to enforce the BEPS Project in a harmonized manner. 
Consequently, every DTT, regardless of its origin in the OECD or UN Model Convention, may be 
affected by the MLI.  
 
The idea of a MLI as a solution to amend bilateral tax treaties did not come up from nowhere. 
During the past decade, several authors brought up new ideas on this subject. Avery Jones and 
Baker suggested the adoption of a multilateral agreement prepared by the OECD which would 
                                                          
11 Stephane Austry and others, 'The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument Amending Tax Treaties' (2016) 70 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 686.  
12 Jonathan Schwarz, Multilateral Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties, Kluwer Intl. Tax Blog (21 Feb. 2017), 
available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2017/02/21/multilateral-negotiation-of-bilateral-treaties (accessed 10 Mar. 
2017). 
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serve as the framework for the amendments.13 The framework agreement would only produce 
effects on the existing DTT if the individual pairs of States (both parties to a DTT) expressly 
declare their consent. This bilateral declaration, which includes information on the DTT and the 
particular provisions to be amended, serves the purpose of a multilateral convention while assuring 
the bilateral nature of a DTT.   
 
Aside from the multilateral convention, other solutions to modify DTTs were developed as well. 
Innamorato proposed the use of ‘multilateral single issue protocols’ which would amend the 
existing tax treaty network.14 These protocols would have an effect on the existing DTTs at the 
time of the ratification without the need of further bilateral declarations. In other words, the 
‘multilateral single issue protocols’ would directly amend the text of the existing tax agreements. 
 
The development of the MLI culminated in the creation of an independent multilateral agreement 
that resembled more closely to Avery Jones’ and Baker’s proposal. The approach taken in the MLI 
is not one of an amending protocol which would directly alter the text of the existing DTTs but 
instead will be applied alongside these DTTs, modifying their application in the process.15 
Therefore, their close interaction requires an in-depth analysis to observe in which way is the 
wording of DTTs impacted by the MLI as they are both regarded as autonomous agreements.  
 
However, the MLI should not be regarded as a regulatory framework. Article (Art.) 30 of the MLI 
establishes that its provisions do not intend to affect the right of the States to carry out subsequent 
modifications to their DTTs.16 The Explanatory Statement affirms this by stating that ‘the 
Convention is not intended to freeze in time the underlying agreement and that Contracting 
Jurisdictions may of course decide to further amend the underlying agreement after it has been 
modified by the Convention’.17  
 
In addition, some of the treaty measures developed in the BEPS Project and implemented through 
the MLI are multilateral by nature, facilitating their coexistence with existing DTTs. The BEPS 
actions include tax treaty related measures that address different topics such as hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, treaty abuse, artificial avoidance and dispute resolution.18 As illustrated in the Final 
Report of the OECD on Action 15, issues regarding the triangular cases involving permanent 
establishments (PE) in Third States and treaty abuse in inappropriate circumstances may only be 
incorporated efficiently in a MLI as they involve various treaty shopping arrangements in their 
                                                          
13 John Avery Jones and Philip Baker, 'The Multiple Amendment Of Bilateral Double Taxation Conventions' (2006) 
60 Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor IBFD, 21.  
14 Caterina Innamorato, 'Expeditious Amendments To Double Tax Treaties Based On The OECD Model' (2008) 36 
Intertax, 123. 
15 OECD, 'Explanatory Statement To The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To 
Prevent Base Erosion An Profit Shifting' (OECD 2016), 3. 
16 OECD (N 3) 42.  
17 OECD (N 15) 10. 
18 OECD (N 3) 1.  
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DTT network.19 At the same time, the MLI may impose provisions with a bilateral nature to level 
the playing field in each State’s treaty network. This means that the MLI sets minimum standards 
in their provisions to enhance the level of commitment of each country in the fight against tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.  
 
2.2. Interpretation of the MLI 
 
Ensuring a consistent interpretation and application of the MLI will facilitate the implementation 
process for every Signatory State. The MLI is an international agreement with the underlying 
purpose of combatting double non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. As an international agreement, its interpretation should follow the interpretation rules 
found in the VCLT and the maxims of international law.  
 
In Art. 31, the VCLT establishes as a general rule that treaties should be interpreted in good faith 
according to the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.20 Art. 31(2) adds that the context of the treaty includes, aside of its 
preamble, text and annexes, any agreement between the parties in connection with the treaty as 
well as any instrument made in connection to the treaty and accepted by the parties.21 Art. 33 calls 
upon interpreters to take into account subsequent agreements between the parties concerning the 
interpretation of the provisions, subsequent practices in the application of the treaty or any relevant 
rules of international law applicable to the treaty.22 Art. 31(4) indicates that a special meaning shall 
be given to a term if established by the parties. According to Art. 32, recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation including the preparatory works of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion as a way of confirming the result obtained by the interpreter from 
the application of Art. 31.23 Lastly, Art. 33 refers to the interpretation of treaties authenticated in 
two or more languages.24 
  
The treaty text of the MLI is the starting point of the interpretative process as it is regarded as the 
expression of all the signatory parties to the Convention. Based on the principle of good faith, the 
grammatical interpretation of its text should not lead to any absurd results.25 Good faith, supported 
by the principle of effectiveness, requires that the interpretation of a treaty that is more in line with 
the object and purpose is preferred to an interpretation that disregards its letter and spirit.26 In the 
case of the MLI, an outcome of the interpretative process may not be a situation that the treaty 
related BEPS measures are trying to combat.  
                                                          
19 OECD (N 2), 24-25. 
20 'UN Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties' [1969] IBFD, 10.  
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid.  
25 J. G. Starke, An Introduction To International Law (11th edn, Butterworths 1977), 434-438. 
26 ibid. 
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By its very nature, the ordinary meaning of the terms has to be established in its own text as the 
MLI stands on its own legal footing. In conformity with Art. 31(2)(a) of the VCLT, the context for 
the purpose of a treaty shall include ‘any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty’. It is logical to the complexity of the 
MLI for it to be accompanied by an Explanatory Statement. In theory, this instrument would fall 
in the category of an agreement as stated in Art. 31(2)(a) as it was adopted simultaneously to the 
conclusion of the MLI, making it binding context.  
 
The OECD had the chance to give a clear legal basis to the Commentaries in the Explanatory 
Statement in order to avoid an ongoing debate in the same fashion as the relationship between the 
OECD Model Convention and its commentaries.27 Nonetheless, the OECD did not seize this 
opportunity and decided to keep a confusing situation for the MLI interpreters. The Explanatory 
Statement sets out its own status by making clear its intention to clarify the operation of the MLI 
to modify DTTs but not to address the interpretation of the underlying BEPS measures.28 
Subsequently, the Explanatory Statement considers that its substantive provisions should be 
interpreted in accordance with the rules established in Art. 31 of the VCLT and declares that the 
object and purpose of the MLI is to implement  the tax treaty-related  BEPS measures.29 
 
Furthermore, the text of the Explanatory Statement was prepared by ‘participants in the ad hoc 
Group’, ‘negotiators’ and ‘members of the ad-hoc Group’ that may not be presumed as parties of 
the MLI.30 For example, the ad-hoc Group is a group of over 96 countries, including non-OECD 
countries, that was set up to develop the Multilateral Instrument but it is still unknown if each of 
these countries will sign the MLI. Also, the participation of the non-OECD countries in the drafting 
of the MLI and in the decision-making bodies was constricted to a consultative role.31 For that 
reason, it cannot be said in stricto sensu that these participants are the same parties in the context 
of the VCLT. However, this circumstance should not diminish the role of the Explanatory 
Statement in establishing the context of the treaty in accordance with Art. 31(2)(a) of the VCLT.  
 
The  Explanatory Statement addresses the operation of the MLI but provides limited direction on 
the substantive or technical tax meaning of the implemented changes to the DTTs’ distributive 
clauses.32 The only exception is the extensive technical explanation of the new arbitration 
                                                          
27 For analysis on this issue, see Sjoerd Douma and Frank Engelen, The Legal Status Of The OECD Commentaries 
(1st edn, IBFD 2008); Ulf Linderfalk and Maria Hilling, 'The Use Of OECD Commentaries As Interpretative Aids - 
The Static/Ambulatory–Approaches Debate Considered From The Perspective Of International Law' (2015) 1 Nordic 
Tax Journal, 34-59. 
28 OECD (N 15) 2. 
29 ibid.  
30 ibid. 
31 Irma Mosquera, 'Legitimacy And The Making Of International Tax Law: The Challenges Of Multilateralism' (2017) 
7 World Tax Journal, 16. 
32 P.J. Hattingh, The Multilateral Instrument from a Legal Perspective: What May Be the Challenges?, 71 Bull. Intl. 
Taxn. 3/4 (2017), Bulletin for International Taxation IBFD, 7. 
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proceedings.33 Concerning the  substantive provisions, the Explanatory Statement remits the lector 
to the BEPS Final Reports which, at first glance, do not have a binding context as they were 
prepared by a smaller group of countries than the ad-hoc Group. Whenever the Explanatory 
Statement follows this practice, ambiguity is produced as shown in the following example: 
 
Art. 4 – Dual Resident Entities  - Paragraph 1 
49. Paragraph 1 modifies the rules for determining the treaty residence of a person 
other than an individual that is a resident of more than one Contracting Jurisdiction, 
and is based on the text of Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
produced in paragraph 48 (page 72) of the Action 6 Report, which reads as follows: 
3. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person…34 
 
Instead of providing a technical commentary, the Explanatory Statement makes a direct reference 
to the Action 6 Report. In so doing, the Explanatory Statement attributes importance to the BEPS 
Final Reports on the interpretation of the MLI provisions.35 This synergy may elevate the status of 
the BEPS Final Reports to binding context when interpreting the MLI. As it seems, interpreters 
must refer to the Explanatory Statement to determine the object and purpose of the MLI and to the 
Reports to find the ordinary meaning of the terms in the MLI.   
 
2.3. Symmetric and Asymmetric Provisions 
 
Symmetry implies that the application of a provision by any of the parties of the treaty will lead to 
the same outcome. In terms of symmetry, the provisions in the MLI can be divided in two 
categories: symmetric and asymmetric provisions.36 The symmetric provisions, which form the 
majority of the MLI, are more straightforward in application as they only present one way of 
application of which scope may only be modified by the reservations made by each party. Art. 6 
of the MLI is a good example of a symmetric provision: 
 
Article 6 – Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement 
1. A Covered Tax Agreement shall be modified to include the following preamble 
text: ‘Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by 
this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements 
                                                          
33 OECD (N 15), 55-65 
34 ibid, 14.  
35 Luis Eduardo Schoueri and Ricardo Galendi Junior, 'Interpretative And Policy Challenges Following The OECD 
Multilateral Instrument (2016) From A Brazilian Perspective' (2017) 71 Bulletin for International Taxation, 2.  
36 Other authors have categorized the provisions of the MLI according to their susceptibility to reservations. This 
categorization will be further discussed in Chapter 4. See also Piergiorgio Valente, 'BEPS Action 15: Release Of 
Multilateral Instrument' (2017) 45 Intertax, 219-228. 
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aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of 
residents of third jurisdictions),’ (…)  
4. A Party may reserve the right for paragraph 1 not to apply to its Covered Tax 
Agreements that already contain preamble language describing the intent of the 
Contracting Jurisdictions to eliminate double taxation without creating 
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation, whether that language is limited 
to cases of tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty shopping 
arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in the Covered Tax Agreement 
for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions) or applies more broadly.37 
 
In Art. 6 of the MLI, the party does not have any discretion in the application of the provision but 
instead it is obliged to modify the existing DTT as instructed by the words ‘shall be modified’. 
Then, the party may only diminish its obligation through the use of a reservation as indicated in 
Paragraph 4 of the same article. As will be discussed in the next Chapter, the MLI safeguards the 
symmetry of its provisions through its complex reservations system unless provided otherwise.38 
 
On the contrary, the asymmetric provisions of the MLI give discretion to the parties on their way 
of application. Asymmetric clauses are not a new feature in the world of international taxation as 
they can be observed in Art. 23 of the 2014 OECD and 2011 UN Model Convention on the methods 
of elimination of double taxation. This type of provisions may be seen in Arts. 5, 7 and 13 of the 
MLI.  
 
For example, Article 13 of the MLI regarding the artificial avoidance of the PE status provides 
three options to the Contracting State on how to apply this provision. Both Option A and Option 
B preserve the exceptions for activities described in Art. 5(4) on activities of preparatory or 
auxiliary character found in the 2014 OECD or 2011 UN Model Convention. However, Option A 
has a different approach as it preserves the exceptions to these activities but to make them subject 
to the condition that the activity be of a preparatory or auxiliary.39 Au contraire, Option B ensures 
that those exceptions will apply irrespectively of whether the activity is of  preparatory or auxiliary 
nature.40 Option C is applying neither Option A nor Option B. If a Contracting State chooses 
Option A while the other Contracting State chooses Option B, the asymmetrical decisions conclude 
in the non-application of the provision in its entirety. This is illustrated in Paragraph 7 of Art. 13 
which states that ‘an Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement 
only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made 
such a notification with respect to that provision’.  
 
                                                          
37 OECD (N 3) 8. 
38 The reservation system in the MLI is examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
39 OECD (N 15) 42.  
40 ibid, 43.  
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2.4. Flexibility in the MLI 
 
The BEPS Final Report on Action 15 acknowledges that the MLI must provide flexibility in the 
level of commitment of the Contracting States.41 In brief, this means that the MLI can provide 
flexibility when the parties do not agree, for reasons of tax policy or lack of commitment towards 
the partner jurisdiction, on implementing certain provision.  
 
The MLI may achieve flexibility through different tools such as:42 
 
a) The discretion given to the States to choose their existing tax treaties that will be modified 
by the MLI; 
b) The inclusion of asymmetric provisions in which the Contracting States can choose 
different alternatives on their form of application; 
c) The use of flexible wording, such as ‘may’, in the design of the provisions;43 
d) The formulation of reservations to the provisions of the MLI; and,  
e) The use of compatibility clauses that preserve the effectiveness of provisions in the existing 
tax treaties.  
 
Even if it is intended for the MLI to apply to the maximum number of existing DTTs, States may 
incorporate or exclude specific DTTs from its scope. Art. 2 of the MLI states that a DTT covered 
by the MLI must be in force between the parties and each party must have made a notification to 
the Depositary (the Secretary General of the OECD) listing the DTT as an agreement to be covered 
by the MLI.44 Therefore, the MLI is not a straitjacket that automatically incorporates the whole 
tax treaty network of a country.45 As of now, States may implement the MLI to any number of 
their existing DTTs without any political sanction if they do not cover existing DTTs that do not 
fulfill the BEPS minimum standards. This issue should be solved on a political level as it is needed 
for Signatory States to have a similar level of commitment in the playing field.  
 
The built-in flexibility in the MLI will establish unevenness in the global tax treaty landscape.46 
Aside from establishing their covered DTTs, States can make use of opt-out reservations that will 
create a broad range of possibilities in the new wording of DTTs as modified by the MLI through 
compatibility clauses. The problems of interpretation arising from the complex reservations system 
and compatibility clauses will be the subject of the following chapters.  
 
                                                          
41 OECD (N 2) 41.  
42 ibid, 42-49. 
43 See, for example, Art. 9(4) of the MLI. 
44 OECD (N 3) 2. 
45 Hattingh (N 32) 4. 
46 ibid, 5.  
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3. Reservations 
 
3.1. General Remarks 
 
Until now, reservations have played a minor role in international taxation. In the international tax 
world, reservations display a disagreement, by an OECD country, concerning the provisions of the 
OECD Model Convention.47 Still, since 1997, non-members have also been allowed to express 
their disagreements with certain aspects of the OECD Model Convention.48 Anyhow, these kinds 
of reservations merely indicate a negotiating position of the States regarding certain provisions in 
the OECD Model.49 As reservations to a non-binding instrument, their importance for the 
interpretation of tax treaties is limited. They may be used by the interpreters to confirm the 
existence of a State’s pre-established intention that departs from the example in the OECD 
Model.50 However, during the drafting process, Contracting States may ignore their reservations 
and it would not affect the Commentaries’ interpretative relevance. 
 
Reservations in the OECD Model should not be confused with reservations to treaties. As a starting 
point, in Art. 3.1(d), the VCLT defines a reservation as a: 
 
[…] unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports 
to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State.51 
 
From this definition, which has been confirmed in the recent UN’s Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to Treaties52, several characteristics of the reservation may be distinguished. First, 
reservations are unilateral statements which means that they are introduced individually by a State 
with the intention of protecting specific interests in relation to norms expressed in the treaty.53 
Second, reservations are formal statements that have to be formulated in writing so that all 
interested parties become aware of their existence.54 Lastly, reservations have an impact on the 
operation of the norms by excluding or modifying the legal effect of provisions in a treaty.55 
                                                          
47 Jacques Sasseville, 'The Role And Evolution Of Reservations, Observations, Positions And Alternative Provisions 
In The OECD Model', Departures from the OECD Model and Commentaries (1st edn, IBFD Publications 2014), 3.  
48 Alberto Vega and Ilja Rudyk, 'Explaining Reservations To The OECD Model Tax Convention: An Empirical 
Approach' (2011) 4 InDret, 4. 
49 Hattingh (N 32) 5.  
50 Alberto Vega, 'The Legal Status And Effects Of Reservations, Observations And Positions To The OECD Model', 
Departures from the OECD Model and Commentaries (1st edn, IBFD Publications 2014), 42. 
51 UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (N 20) 5.  
52 UN, 'Guide To Practice On Reservations To Treaties' (United Nations 2011). 
53 Frank Horn, Reservations And Interpretative Declarations To Multilateral Treaties (1st edn, Swedish Institute of 
International Law 1988), 44.  
54 ibid.  
55 ibid, 45.  
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According to the latter characteristic, which differentiates reservations from any other unilateral 
statement, the objective of a reservation is to alter the scope or operation of the norm itself, not to 
change the wording of the provisions.  
 
In addition, Arts. 19 to 23 of the VCLT also regulate reservations. Article 19 allows States to 
formulate reservations unless: a) they are prohibited by the treaty; b) the treaty provides that only 
specified reservations may be made, which is the case of the MLI56; or, c) when the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. In virtue of the inclusion of specified 
provisions in the MLI and the clear statement on the object and purpose of the Convention, 
theoretically, States should not have any difficulties on depositing valid57 reservations that would 
produce a reciprocal legal effect.  
 
A valid reservation modifies the reserving State’s rights and obligations under the treaty with 
respect to the objectionable provision.58 In the MLI, a reserving State formulates excluding 
reservations to free itself from the obligation of applying the treaty-related BEPS measures to their 
existing DTTs. How does a reservation affects vis-à-vis the other treaty partner? The legal effects 
of a reservation should be observed from two sides of the same coin. With regards to the legal 
effects of reservations, Art. 21(1)(a) of the VCLT declares that:  
 
A reservation […] modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other 
party (the accepting State) the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation 
relates to the extent of the reservation; and modifies those provisions to the same 
extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State.59 
 
Horn asserts that the immediate effect of reservations is advantageous to the reserving State 
because they delimit the correlate rights of the other parties and widen their obligations.60 He 
demonstrates the logic behind this statement through the following graph:61 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Art. 28 of the MLI states that no reservations may be made except those expressly permitted by the treaty.   
57 For the purpose of this thesis, a valid reservation is one the does not preclude the reserving State of becoming a 
party to the treaty.  
58 Jean Koh Peters, 'Reservations To Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reﬂects World Vision' 
(1982) 23 Harvard International Law Journal, 71.  
59 UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (N 20) 10 – See also Article 28(3) of the MLI which extracts the 
unaltered provision of the VCLT.  
60 Horn (N 53) 92.  
61 ibid.  
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Figure extracted from Frank Horn’s Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties (1988). 
 
The State that formulates a reservation wants to diminish the obligations created by the reserved 
provision. The reserving State will have more liberty on its actions as it is not bound to comply 
with any obligations. Consequently, the confronted or accepting State has no power to claim any 
rights over the reserved obligations. In other words, a reserved provision will produce no legal 
effects on any of the parties unless there is an objection to it.  
 
The figures of acceptance and objections are foreseen in the MLI as they are important features of 
reservations in public international law. Art. 20 of the VCLT establishes rules on these subjects 
without defining their concepts. As Pellet suggests, the words ‘acceptance and ‘objection’ should 
be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning which implies they have opposite meanings 
that leads to different effects.62  
 
Acceptance by the parties to the treaty of the reservations made by a State is a condition for the 
validity of the reservation. Most of the time, it arises from the absence of objections made by the 
other parties in the treaty.63 In the case of the MLI, tacit acceptance to reservations is observed in 
Art. 28(2)(b) which states:  
 
Reservations made under subparagraph a) are subject to acceptance. A reservation 
made under subparagraph a) shall be considered to have been accepted by a Party 
if it has not notified the Depositary that it objects to the reservation by the end of a 
period of twelve calendar months beginning on the date of notification of the 
reservation by the Depositary or by the date on which it deposits its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, or approval, whichever is later.64   
 
This provision follows the standards of implied or tacit consent in Art. 20(5) of the VCLT. It can 
be said that the provision does not only clarify the notion of consent but it also operates as a subtle 
                                                          
62 Alain Pellet and Daniel Müller, 'Reservations To Treaties: An Objection To A Reservation Is Definitely Not An 
Acceptance', The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2011), 38. 
63 ibid. 
64 OECD (N 3) 38. 
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restraint on the power of States to oppose reservations at will.65 The twelve months threshold 
impedes a State to present an objection whenever it desires to. Albeit, this practice would not be 
of importance if incompatible reservations are considered void ab initio, such that no objection is 
necessary and the failure to act within the time threshold cannot be treated as tacit acceptance.66 
 
Together with the acceptance of reservations, objections are also discerned in Art. 28(2)(b) of the 
MLI. Objections are oppositions to the reservations formulated by a State. Under Art. 21 of the 
VCLT, if a non-reserving State objects a reservation without denying the reserving State’s status 
as a party to the treaty, then the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply between 
the two States to the extent of reservation.67 In contrast to the effect of an acceptance, the effect of 
an objection hinders the modification of the provision for both States.  
 
In summary, three sets of bilateral relations might be created:68 
 
a) Between the reserving States and the accepting States, causing an alteration of the original 
terms by the reservation; 
b) Between all the non-reserving States, maintaining the original terms; and, 
c) Between the reserving States and the objecting states, resulting in the inapplicability of the 
reserved provisions to the extent of the reservation. 
 
3.2 Reservation System in the MLI 
 
3.2.1. Types 
 
The MLI introduces a complex system of reservations in virtue of flexibility. As previously 
mentioned, Art. 28(1) of the MLI provides an extensive list of the permitted reservations to the 
treaty. These specified reservations, also called opt-out reservations, are excluding in nature as 
they absolve the reserving States to comply with a positive obligation (the application of a 
provision) .69   
 
However, the Contracting States may only opt out of a provision entirely if the provision does not 
reflect a minimum standard. The minimum standards encompass model provisions to prevent 
treaty abuse, standardized country-by-country reporting, peer review process to address harmful 
tax practices and an agreement to secure progress on dispute resolution. 70 In this regard, the only 
                                                          
65 Peters (N 58)103. 
66 Edward T. Swaine, 'Reserving' (2006) 31 The Yale Journal of International Law, 317. 
67 ibid, 319. 
68 ibid, 312. 
69 The only example in the MLI where it allows the reserving State to modify, instead of excluding, the provision is 
Art. 4(3)(e). 
70 OECD, 'Background Brief - Inclusive Framework On BEPS' (OECD 2017), 7.  
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Arts. of the MLI that reflect a minimum standard are Art. 6 (Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement), 
Art. 7 (Prevention of Treaty Abuse) and Art. 16 (Mutual Agreement Procedure). 
 
Moreover, reservations are specifically designed for each substantive provision in the MLI.71 
There is not a specific pattern on the permitted reservations but, in most cases, they leave the 
reserving State the right to neglect the entire or part of the provision. The following examples may 
illustrate how this reservation system works: 
 
Article 5 – Application of Methods for Elimination of Double Taxation 
(Asymmetric provision) 
8. A Party that does not choose to apply an Option under paragraph 1 may reserve 
the right for the entirety of this Article not to apply with respect to one or more 
identified Covered Tax Agreements (or with respect to all of its Covered Tax 
Agreements). 
9. A Party that does not choose to apply Option C may reserve the right, with respect 
to one or more identified Covered Tax Agreements (or with respect to all of its 
Covered Tax Agreements), not to permit the other Contracting Jurisdiction(s) to 
apply Option C. 
 
Article 10 – Anti-abuse Rule for Permanent Establishments Situated in Third 
Jurisdictions (Symmetric provision) 
5. A Party may reserve the right:  
a) for the entirety of this Article not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements;  
b) for the entirety of this Article not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that 
already contain the provisions described in paragraph 4; 
c) for this Article to apply only to its Covered Tax Agreements that already contain 
the provisions described in paragraph 4.72 
 
Both symmetric and asymmetric provisions are subject to reservations in different terms. Each 
reservation has been tailor-made for each provision as a result of the negotiations in the 
development of the instrument. Nonetheless, the general rules on reservations are applicable 
regardless of any specific characteristics related to the type of provision (if it is symmetric or 
asymmetric) or the inclusion of special practices (e.g. rules that will only apply to provisions that 
serve as minimum standards).  
 
 
 
                                                          
71 OECD (N 15) 4. 
72 OECD (N 3) 3-6. 
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3.2.2. Application of Reservations and Impact on Interpretation 
 
Whenever a Contracting State formulates a reservation in the MLI, there will be an effect on the 
wording of the modified provision in the DTT as a consequence of the legal effects of reservations 
in combination with the bilateral nature of DTTs. On this subject, Hattingh argues there may be 
several ways to interpret the amendment of the existing DTTs:73 
 
a) A clause in the DTT will only be amended as displayed in the MLI if both Contracting 
States make the identical reservation permitted for in the MLI. This situation requires the 
reservations to match and, as Hattingh points out, provisions in the MLI may be silent or 
explicit in this respect. For that reason, this approach disregards the modification of the 
provision if only partial agreements have been reached between a reserving State and a 
Contracting State. or, 
b) Only the words in common between a reserving State and an accepting State should 
provide the modifications of the DTT between them. This way of interpreting amendments 
is more congruent to the flexibility of the MLI as it establishes the text of the MLI that will 
be considered to change the DTT text, according to the decisions taken by the parties.  
 
Under the latter approach, four sets of outcomes will arise from the effects of the reservations in 
the MLI on the text of a DTT:74 
 
1. If there are no reservations between the parties, the text of the MLI applies strictly in the 
DTT. 
2. If one State formulates a reservation and the other accepts it, the reserved part of the MLI 
text will be excluded from the text in the DTT.   
3. If both States formulate the same reservations, the reserved parts of the MLI text are 
omitted by the parties in the DTT. 
4. If both States formulate different reservations, the reserved parts of the MLI text are not 
taken into consideration in the DTT.  
 
By way of illustration, the following chart shows how to determine the final text of the MLI 
provisions under different circumstances: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 Hattingh (N 32) 4-5  
74 For the purpose of this comment, the author refers to reservations of an excluding nature.  
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Text of the Provision 
(e.g. Article 3 - Transparent 
Entities) 
Reservations 
Formulated 
DTT Text as modified by the 
MLI 
1. For the purposes of a Covered Tax 
Agreement, income derived by or 
through an entity or arrangement that is 
treated as wholly or partly fiscally 
transparent under the tax law of either 
Contracting Jurisdiction shall be 
considered to be income of a resident of 
a Contracting Jurisdiction but only to 
the extent that the income is treated, for 
purposes of taxation by that 
Contracting Jurisdiction, as the income 
of a resident of that Contracting 
Jurisdiction. 
 
2. Provisions of a Covered Tax 
Agreement that require a Contracting 
Jurisdiction to exempt from income tax 
or provide a deduction or credit equal 
to the income tax paid with respect to 
income derived by a resident of that 
Contracting Jurisdiction which may be 
taxed in the other Contracting 
Jurisdiction according to the provisions 
of the Covered Tax Agreement shall 
not apply to the extent that such 
provisions allow taxation by that other 
Contracting Jurisdiction solely because 
the income is also income derived by a 
resident of that other Contracting 
Jurisdiction. 
 
No reservations are 
formulated. 
 
The entire text in Art. 3 of the 
MLI will be applied strictly in 
the DTT.  
State A reserves the 
entirety of the 
Article. 
(Reservation in Art. 
3(5)(a)) 
 
State B accepts the 
reservation. 
The entire provision will not 
apply between the Contracting 
States.  
Both States reserve 
paragraph 1 not to 
apply to the treaty. 
(Reservation in Art. 
3(5)(b))  
Paragraph 1 is omitted but 
paragraph 2 is taken into 
consideration in the DTT text. 
Paragraph 2 represents the only 
common text in between the 
Contracting States.  
State A reserves 
paragraph 1 not to 
apply to the treaty. 
(Reservation in Art. 
3(5)(b)). 
 
State B reserves 
paragraph 2 not to 
apply to the treaty. 
(Reservation in Art. 
3(5)(f))  
Both paragraphs are not taken 
into consideration in the DTT 
text as they are reserved by both 
Contracting States in different 
formulations. In this case, the 
legal effect will be the same as 
if there was a reservation for the 
entire provision.  
  
 
 
Due to the flexibility of the MLI, a provision may follow specific rules on reservations. For 
example, Art. 7 of the MLI proposes the use of a Principal Purpose Test (PPT) or Simplified 
Limitation of Benefits Provision (LOB) Clause to prevent treaty abuse. In this particular provision, 
the MLI allows the Contracting States to reserve their right to adopt it if they decide to meet the 
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minimum standards through a mutually satisfactory solution. Consequently, this reservation leads 
to the non-application of the entire Art. To such degree, regardless of specific rules, the way in 
which reservations operate in order to filter the final text of a provision is consistent throughout 
the MLI.  
 
It is visible how reservations may impair the uniformity of the DTT text depending on the States’ 
formulations of reservations. As can be seen from the chart above, a MLI provision can be 
excluded in part or entirely. After Contracting States determine the text of the MLI to be excluded 
or not, then the parties may apply it to their existing DTTs. By way of explanation, a reservation 
to the MLI may be seen as modifier of another modifier (the MLI provision itself), having an 
impact on the text of the DTT. 
 
4. Compatibility Clauses 
 
4.1. General Remarks 
 
The MLI serves as a new layer of content which will be applicable to thousands of DTTs in the 
international tax treaty network. Therefore, it is important to know not only to which DTTs the 
MLI will be applicable but also to observe to which extent it will alter their text. Compatibility 
clauses are in charge of determining how the MLI interacts with the existing DTTs after 
reservations have been formulated. This stage of the interpretation process should define how the 
text of a specific treaty is amended by the MLI. 
  
In 1966, the International Law Commission of the United Nations (ILC) defined a compatibility 
clause as: 
 
… a clause intended to regulate the relation between the provisions of the treaty 
and those of another treaty or of any other treaty relating to the matters with which 
the treaty deals. Sometimes the clause concerns the relation of the treaty to a prior 
treaty, sometimes its relation to a future treaty and sometimes to any treaty past or 
future.75 
 
The use of compatibility clauses as instruments of clarification between treaties is common in 
international agreements. In the absence of general hierarchy of treaties, compatibility clauses 
dictate the interaction between newly adopted instruments and existing agreements as their 
                                                          
75 International Law Commission of the United Nations, 'Report Of The Of The International Law Commission On 
The Work Of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May - 19 July 1966, Official Records Of The General Assembly, Twenty-
First Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/6309/Rev.1)' (UN 1966), 214. 
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provisions overlap and may potentially contradict each other.76 Examples of this practice can be 
observed from early to modern treaties such as: 
 
 Art. 26 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters77 
 Art. 8(3) of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism78 
 Art. 311(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea79 
 Art. 3(1) Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of 
America80 
 
The wording of compatibility clauses in multilateral agreements varies as a consequence of the 
drafting process that is subject to political interests and objectives.81 The States involved in the 
drafting process may alter the temporal element of these clauses in favor of an existing or new 
treaty. In that respect, compatibility clauses can be divided into three categories:82 
 
a) Clauses giving priority to existing or later treaties – which explicitly provide primacy to 
earlier or later treaties or state that the treaty should not be considered incompatible to pre-
existing or future norms; 
b) Clauses claiming primacy over later treaties – which provide primacy over later treaties or 
prohibit the conclusion of future incompatible agreements; and, 
c) Clauses claiming priority over existing treaties – which establish that provisions in the 
treaty have primacy over existing norms. 
 
In general, compatibility clauses in the MLI follow the spirit of the latter category. Clauses 
claiming priority over existing treaties are reaffirmations of the lex posterior principle.83 Applied 
in a strict manner, these type of clauses derogate the provisions in the earlier treaty.84 They can 
also be applied in a lighter form by stating that the clauses will not affect the existing rights and 
obligations deriving from existing international agreements.85 In any way, if the earlier treaty is 
                                                          
76 Nele Matz-Lück, 'Treaties, Conflict Clauses', Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Online edn, 
Oxford University Press 2015), 1.  
77 European Convention On Mutual Assistance In Criminal Matters (1st edn, Council of Europe Publication 1959). 
78 European Convention On The Suppression Of Terrorism (1st edn, Council of Europe Publications 1977). 
79 United Nations, United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea (1st edn, United Nations 1982). 
80 'Agreement On Extradition Between The European Union And The United States Of America' (N 8).  
81 Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester, 'The UNESCO Convention On Cultural Diversity And WTO Law: A Case Study 
In Fragmentation Of International Law' (2008) 42 Journal of World Trade, 32.  
82 Matz-Lück (N 76) 3. See also International Law Commission of the United Nations, 'Fragmentation Of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion Of International Law, Finalized By Martti 
Koskenniemi' (United Nations 2006), 135-138.  
83 Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(C) VCLT And The Principle Of Systemic Integration (1st edn, Brill Nijhoff 2015), 
190. 
84 Matz-Lück (N 76) 3. See Article 311(1) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as an example. 
85 See also Art. 22 of 'Convention On Biological Diversity' (UN 1992). 
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not terminated by the Contracting States, then this treaty applies to the extent that its provisions 
are compatible with those of the later treaty in conformity with Art. 30(3) of the VCLT. 
 
If compatibility clauses have worked out in several international agreements, there should be a 
positive rate of success for their inclusion in the MLI. For this reason, the OECD has been 
enthusiastic on their inclusion in the MLI since the beginning of its drafting process. However, 
several commentators in the public discussion indicated that problems, ranging from the extensive 
worldwide treaty network to the differences in languages, would affect the practicality of a 
compatibility clause.86 As the United States Council for International Business (USCIB) 
encapsulated in its technical comments, ‘the use of compatibility clauses to implement the BEPS 
outcomes creates the possibility of real confusion for both taxpayers and tax administrations in 
trying to identify and apply the treaties that will be modified by the MLI’.87 
 
4.2. Compatibility System in the MLI  
 
4.2.1. Entry into force, Notifications and Compatibility Clauses 
 
Before venturing into the compatibility clauses, it is important to give an overview on how the 
MLI enters into force for a State. To join the MLI, States must sign and deposit a ratification, 
acceptance or approval instrument with the Depositary.88 Then, the MLI shall enter into force three 
months after the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.89 After the 
deposit of the fifth instrument, for each new Signatory, the MLI will enter into force three months 
after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.90 Throughout this process, 
Contracting States are able to inform the Depositary about different subjects including: 
 
a) Existing DTTs covered by the MLI; 
b) Formulation of reservations;  
c) Notifications reflecting the choices made on asymmetric provisions; and,  
d) Notifications regarding which specific provisions in the covered DTTs are within the scope 
of the compatibility clauses for each provision of the MLI.  
 
The latter notifications ensure the clarity about the existing provisions that will be superseded or 
modified by the MLI.91 Ideally, every Contracting State will identify these provisions and link 
them to the correct Art. in the MLI. If done correctly, a compatibility clause may be applied 
                                                          
86 Caroline Silberztein and Jean-Baptiste Tristram, 'OECD: Multilateral Instrument To Implement BEPS' [2017] 
International Transfer Pricing Journal – IBFD, 352 
87 OECD, 'Comments Received On Public Discussion Draft - Action 15: Development Of A Multilateral Instrument 
To Implement The Tax Treaty Related BEPS Measures' 226. 
88 OECD (N 15) 76-83.  
89 ibid.  
90 ibid.  
91 ibid, 5.  
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transparently without having any interpretation issue on which Art. of the existing DTT will be 
altered.  
 
In the same fashion as the Agreement on Extradition between the EU and the USA, compatibility 
clauses in the MLI address complex situations. In these clauses, a variety of details can be found 
such as the prevailing MLI provision. Also, due to the different terminology and wording of DTTs, 
the language of compatibility clauses describes in general terms the type of provisions of DTTs 
that will be modified by the MLI.92 
 
The Explanatory Statement enlists and describes the type of compatibility clauses found in the 
MLI along with its form of application based on the Contracting States’ notification.93 
Compatibility clauses in the MLI are divided into four types: 
 
1. Provision of the MLI applies ‘in place of’ an existing provision of a covered DTT; 
2. Provision of the MLI ‘applies to’ or ‘modifies’ an existing provision of a covered DTT; 
3. Provision of the MLI applies ‘in the absence of’ an existing provision of a covered DTT; 
and, 
4. Provision of the MLI applies ‘in place of or in the absence of’ an existing provision of a 
covered DTT.  
 
Where a MLI provision applies only ‘in place of’ an existing provision, the MLI provision replaces 
an existing provision if one is present in the covered DTT, and is not applicable if there is no 
existing provision.94 The notification establishes the MLI provision will apply only in cases where 
all Contracting States make a notification with respect to the existing provision of the covered 
DTT.95 
 
Where a MLI provision ‘applies to’ or ‘modifies’ an existing provision, the MLI provision changes 
the application of an existing provision without replacing it.96 For this reason, it can only apply if 
there is an existing provision in the covered DTT. The notification establishes that the MLI 
provision will apply only in cases where all Contracting States make a notification with respect to 
the existing provision of the covered DTT.97 
 
Where a MLI provision applies only ‘in the absence of’ an existing provision, the MLI provision 
will apply only in cases where the Contracting States notify the absence of an existing provision 
                                                          
92 Nathalie Bravo, 'The Multilateral Tax Instrument And Its Relationship With Tax Treaties' (2016) 7 World Tax 
Journal, 297. 
93 OECD (N 15) 6. 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 ibid. 
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in the covered DTT.98 No notification is needed as there is no similar provision in the covered 
DTT. 
 
Where a MLI provision applies ‘in place of or in the absence of’ an existing provision, the MLI 
provision will apply in any situation.99 If all Contracting States notify the existence of an existing 
provision, that provision will be replaced by the provision of the MLI to the extent described in 
the compatibility clause.100 Where the Contracting States do not notify the existence of a provision, 
the provision of the MLI will still apply. If there is an existing provision which has not been 
notified by all Contracting Jurisdictions, the MLI provision will prevail over that existing 
provision, superseding it to the extent of incompatibility between them.101 In case there is no 
existing provision, the provision of the MLI will be added to the Covered DTT.102 
 
In Arts. 3 to 17 of the MLI, most of these provisions103 contain a clause that applies ‘in place of or 
in the absence of’ an existing provision of a covered DTT, making it the most common type of 
compatibility clause in the MLI. As mentioned before, these clauses claim priority for the MLI 
provisions over existing DTT’s provisions. Phrases in these compatibility clauses such as ‘shall 
apply’ provide force to the provision’s wording vis-à-vis the earlier treaties. The compatibility 
clause in Art. 9 of the MLI illustrates this point clearly: 
 
Article 9 – Capital Gains from Alienation of Shares or Interests of Entities Deriving 
their Value Principally from Immovable Property 
5. Paragraph 4 shall apply in place of or in the absence of provisions of a Covered 
Tax Agreement providing that gains derived by a resident of a Contracting 
Jurisdiction from the alienation of shares or other rights of participation in an entity 
may be taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction provided that these shares or 
rights derived more than a certain part of their value from immovable property (real 
property) situated in that other Contracting Jurisdiction, or provided that more than 
a certain part of the property of the entity consists of such immovable property (real 
property).104 
 
In this provision, similar to many others in the MLI, the predominance of the MLI over the existing 
DTTs is clear. The MLI provision annuls the application of the existing DTT provision. 
Compatibility clauses applying ‘in the place of’ will have a similar effect while the ones applying 
‘in the absence of’ will overlap the provision of the MLI on the existing DTT. However, 
                                                          
98 OECD (N 15) 6. 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
103 The only exceptions are Arts. 5, 12, 13 and 15 of the MLI. 
104 OECD (N 3) 15. 
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compatibility clauses with the ‘applies to’ or ‘modifies’ formulation will change the wording of 
the existing provision. The next section of this chapter will address the practical implications of 
these effects resulting from the application of compatibility clauses.   
 
4.2.2. Application of Compatibility Clauses and Impact on Interpretation 
 
A first step in the process of implementing the MLI is to see if the MLI applies or not to the existing 
DTTs. In a recent article, Valente assesses this step by examining four important Italian DTTs with 
Germany, China, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA.105 In his analysis, Valente assumes the 
Contracting State will not reserve any rights to the application of the MLI.106 Then, he proceeds to 
do an initial evaluation of the MLI provision and observes if any similar provision is contained in 
the existing DTTs.107 Finally, he assesses on how both provisions will interact by determining 
which provision will supersede or will be modified.108 Thereafter, the next step in the process will 
naturally be to observe how these changes are reflected on paper in a consolidated text.109 For the 
sake of simplicity, the author will use the Italy-UK DTT110 in a practical example as it has already 
passed through prior examination. Regarding the amendment to the PE definition that targets the 
issue of commissionaire arrangements, the following chart will show the existing provision in the 
DTT, the applicable MLI provision, their main differences, the relevant compatibility clause and 
the new consolidated text:  
 
Existing 
Provision 
Article 5 – Permanent Establishment 
(4) A person acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an enterprise of the 
other Contracting State—other than an agent of an independent status to whom 
paragraph (5) of this Article applies—shall be deemed to be a permanent 
establishment in the first mentioned State if he has, and habitually exercises in 
that State, an authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, 
unless his activities are limited to the purchase of goods or merchandise for the 
enterprise. 
(5) An enterprise of a Contracting State shall not be deemed to have a 
permanent establishment in the other Contracting State merely because it 
carries on business in that other State through a broker, general commission 
agent or any other agent of an independent status, where such persons are 
acting in the ordinary course of their business. 
                                                          
105 Piergiorgio Valente, 'BEPS Action 15: Release Of Multilateral Instrument' (2017) 45 Intertax, 220. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid, 222-227. 
108 ibid. 
109 For the author, the consolidated text provides a final view on the object of interpretation as it embodies what the 
users of the MLI will actually read when applying it. 
110 'UK/Italy Double Taxation Convention' [1988] HMSO. 
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MLI 
Provision 
Article 12 – Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status 
through Commissionaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies  
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that define the 
term ‘permanent establishment’, but subject to paragraph 2, where a person is 
acting in a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement on behalf of 
an enterprise and, in doing so, habitually concludes contracts, or habitually 
plays the principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely 
concluded without material modification by the enterprise, and these contracts 
are: 
a) in the name of the enterprise; or 
b) for the transfer of the ownership of, or for the granting of the right to use, 
property owned by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use; or 
c) for the provision of services by that enterprise,  
that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment in that 
Contracting Jurisdiction in respect of any activities which that person 
undertakes for the enterprise unless these activities, if they were exercised by 
the enterprise through a fixed place of business of that enterprise situated in 
that Contracting Jurisdiction, would not cause that fixed place of business to 
be deemed to constitute a permanent establishment under the definition of 
permanent establishment included in the Covered Tax Agreement (as it may 
be modified by this Convention). 
 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the person acting in a Contracting 
Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement on behalf of an enterprise of the other 
Contracting Jurisdiction carries on business in the first mentioned Contracting 
Jurisdiction as an independent agent and acts for the enterprise in the ordinary 
course of that business. Where, however, a person acts exclusively or almost 
exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is closely related, 
that person shall not be considered to be an independent agent within the 
meaning of this paragraph with respect to any such enterprise. 
Main 
Differences 
- Expansion of the definition of an agent while respecting the concept of a 
PE under the existing DTT 
- Description of the contracts concluded in behalf of the enterprise 
- An independent agent that acts exclusively or almost exclusively on behalf 
of  closely related enterprises (defined in Art. 15 of the MLI) will not be 
considered an independent agent. 
Relevant 
Compatibility 
Clause 
Both paragraphs 1 and 2 apply a ‘in place of’ compatibility clause.   
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Consolidated 
Text 
Article 5 – Permanent Establishment 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the term "permanent establishment" 
means a fixed place of business in which the business of an enterprise is wholly 
or partly carried on. 
(2) The term "permanent establishment" shall include especially… 
(3) The term "permanent establishment" shall not be deemed to include… 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that define the 
term ‘permanent establishment’, but subject to paragraph 2… 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the person acting in a Contracting 
Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement on behalf of an enterprise… 
(6) The fact that a company which is a resident of a Contracting State controls 
or is controlled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State, 
or which carries on business in that other State (whether through a permanent 
establishment or otherwise), shall not of itself constitute either company a 
permanent establishment of the other. 
 
 
The consolidated text combines two different legal texts that should be interpreted simultaneously. 
As new terms are replacing the text in the existing DTT, the rules on defining their meaning have 
to be found in both the existing DTT and the MLI. In the Italy-UK DTT, following the 1963 OECD 
Model Convention111, the rule of interpretation of an undefined term, also known as the renvoi 
clause112, is contained in Art. 3(2): 
 
As regards the application of this Convention by a Contracting State any term not 
otherwise defined shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning 
which it has under the laws of that Contracting State relating to the taxes which are 
the subject of the Convention.113 
 
On the other hand, the MLI’s renvoi clause appears in Art. 2(2):  
 
As regards the application of this Convention at any time by a Party, any term not 
defined herein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it 
has at that time under the relevant Covered Tax Agreement.114 
 
                                                          
111 The 1977 OECD Model Convention refers to ‘the law of that State concerning the taxes to which the Convention 
applies’. In 1995, Art. 3(2) was amended to give the status of lex specialis to national tax laws over other domestic 
legislation in order to prevail in its application on interpretation matters.  
112 See Klaus Vogel, 'La Clause De Renvoi De L'article 3, Par. 2 Modele De Convention De L'OCDE', Réflection 
offertes a Paul Sibille, Études de fiscalité (1st edn, Établissments Émille Bruylant 1981). 
113 'UK/Italy Double Taxation Convention' (N 110) 5.  
114 OECD (N 3) 2. 
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The MLI delegates the meaning of undefined terms to the DTT while the DTT refers the same to 
national legislation of the Contracting State applying it. It is a chain that may cause trouble to 
treaty interpreters. In the example regarding Art. 5 of the Italy-UK DTT and Art. 12 of the MLI, 
the meaning of legal terms115 in the consolidated text will be tracked in three layers of legal text: 
the domestic legislation, the DTT and the MLI. For instance, the technical meaning of a PE is 
defined by the text in the DTT (as it may be modified by the MLI).116 However, the definition of 
a ‘closely related enterprise’ is developed in Art. 15 of the MLI whereas other terms such as ‘the 
transfer of ownership’ (e.g. legal or economic ownership) will be determined through the 
application of domestic legislation.  
 
The meaning and application of the renvoi clause in Art. 3(2) of the OECD and the UN Model 
Convention has been a disputed topic in doctrine. As pointed out by Lang, some authors focus on 
the phrase ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ and seek for an autonomous interpretation of 
DTTs, without reference to domestic legislation, whereas others ignore the phrase and, as a general 
rule, interpret undefined tax treaty terms in accordance with domestic law.117 In search of a neutral 
position, other authors put emphasis on the word ‘require’ as taking into consideration the context 
only if supported by strong argumentation. Therefore, the renvoi clause in Art. 3(2) of the OECD 
and UN Model Convention has raised many questions related to interpretation that may be relevant 
for the interaction between the MLI and the existing DTT such as:118 
 
 Should the term ‘context’ in Art. 3(2) be interpreted narrowly to include the text of the 
treaty only or broadly so as to include other means of interpretation specified in Articles 
31 and 32 of the VCLT? 
 Does the meaning of a term in its context, however defined always prevail over the meaning 
of same term under the domestic laws of the Contracting States, or does the word ‘requires’ 
in Art. 3(2) imply that there must be strong evidence that the parties intended a specific 
meaning? 
 
The use of a renvoi clause is necessary as the MLI is not isolated from the DTTs but they are 
intimate, coexistent instruments. Contrary to the application of the renvoi clause in a DTT, the 
renvoi clause in the MLI is supported by compatibility clauses that dictate the scope of the 
reference of the MLI to the existing DTT.  Also, both instruments share most of their legal terms 
and technical meanings. However, the context in which a term is used in the MLI and the DTT 
may differ as an interpreter has to analyze the weight of the text of the existing DTT against the 
                                                          
115 The renvoi clause only deals with legal terms as terms not found in law should be interpreted in accordance with 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Franciscus Antonius Engelen, Interpretation Of Tax Treaties Under International 
Law (1st edn, IBFD 2004), 485. 
116 According to the renvoi clause in the MLI, the term will have the meaning at the time when covered DTT was 
signed. 
117 Michael Lang, 'OECD - 2008 OECD Model: Conflicts Of Qualification And Double Non-Taxation' (2009) 63 
Bulletin for International Taxation, 209.  
118 Engelen (N 115) 475. 
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purpose of the MLI which is to implement the tax treaty-related BEPS measures. Because the 
provisions of the MLI become part of the text of an existing DTT through the use of compatibility 
clauses, the context in which a term is used in the existing DTT should be interpreted in accordance 
with the purpose of the MLI. A case of conflicts of qualification is a good illustration of the latter 
statement.   
 
Art. 5 of the MLI refers to the application of methods for the elimination of double taxation.119 In 
brief, this asymmetric provision targets qualification problems from the application of DTTs in 
relation to domestic legislation. The three options given to the Contracting States require additional 
conditions for the Residence State to provide for exemption of income or a switch-over clause 
from exemption to the credit method. In any way, these options only affect existing DTTs that 
apply the exemption method. In the DTTs examined by Valente, this MLI provision would only 
be added to the Italy-Germany DTT120 which determines a conditional exemption of dividends 
paid between companies-residents of both States and also for exemption in Germany of taxable 
income items in Italy.121 If Option C of Art. 5 (switch-over clause to credit method) of the MLI is 
chosen by Germany, income taxable in Italy will qualify for deduction of the tax actually paid and 
not for exemption in Germany.122 Assisted by a ‘in place of’ compatibility clause, Option C 
replaces the previous provision that granted an exemption with progression.    
 
Similar to the existing provision in the Italy-Germany DTT, Art. 23(a) OECD and UN Model 
provides that a Contracting State is required to grant relief from double taxation, through the 
exemption method, if a resident of the Residence State derives income or owns capital which, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention (DTT), may be taxed in the Source State. The 
words ‘in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed’ are read in the context 
of the renvoi clause for the purpose of an interpretation of Article 23(a). As Engelen states, this 
phrase is open to two interpretations:123 
 
1. So far as the application of the DTT by the Residence State, any term not defined in the 
DTT should be deemed to have the meaning it has for the purposes of the relevant 
provisions in its domestic legislation. In this case, the Residence State is under no 
obligation to grant relief from double taxation in situations where the provisions of the 
DTT provide that the item of income concerned, as characterized under that State’s 
domestic legislation, may not be taxed in the Source State. This way of interpretation 
ignores that the DTT provides that the item of income may be taxed in the Source State if 
characterized in accordance with the provisions of its domestic law.  
 
                                                          
119 OECD (N 3) 6.  
120 'Germany/Italy Double Taxation Convention' [1993] IBFD. 
121 Valente (N 105) 223.  
122 ibid. 
123 Engelen (N 115) 503-505. 
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2. A Residence State should grant relief from double taxation in cases where the provisions 
of the DTT provide that the income, as characterized under the Source State’s domestic 
legislation, may be taxed in that State even if there is a possibility that the item of income 
may not be taxed in the Source State. In good faith, the Residence State cannot ignore its 
own obligation and the legal right of the Source State to characterize an item of income by 
reference to its domestic legislation.  
 
If Article 23(a) is interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the words ‘in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed’ in their context 
and in the light of the object and purpose of the DTT, then the Residence State must comply with 
the characterization of an item of income according to the domestic legislation of the Source State 
unless the context requires differently.124 The Residence State cannot escape its obligation on 
granting a relief for double taxation since an item of income is involved that may be taxed in the 
Source State. However, this reasoning diverges when a MLI provision is applied. A similar phrase 
appears in Option C of Art. 5 of the MLI that announces: 
 
Where a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction derives income or owns capital 
which may be taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement (except to the extent that these provisions 
allow taxation by that other Contracting Jurisdiction solely because the income is 
also income derived by a resident of that other Contracting Jurisdiction) (emphasis 
added) the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction shall allow…125 
 
In the author’s opinion, based on the context of the MLI, the Residence State has no obligation to 
grant relief from double taxation if the item of income concerned, as characterized in that State, 
may not be taxed in the Source State. There is strong evidence, in the wording of the MLI and its 
clear preamble, that supports the meaning of terms in its context. Therein, the MLI provision does 
not only supersede the provision in the DTTs but also modifies the context in which the renvoi 
clause of the DTTs applies in regard of the text of the DTTs and the domestic laws of the 
Contracting States. Following the rules of interpretation in the VCLT, it is important that the 
context in which a term is used in the MLI leads to a result that opposes BEPS schemes while 
having in mind that the context itself may not give rise to an obligation that cannot be derived from 
the text of the DTTs referred.126 These remarks concern any interpretation issue arising from the 
interaction of MLI provisions with existing DTTs.  
 
 
                                                          
124 ibid, 506. 
125 OECD (N 3) 6.  
126 Schoueri (N 35) 3. 
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4.2.3. Incompatibility 
 
With regard to conflict between treaties, incompatibility exists when it is possible for a party to 
two treaties to fulfill with an obligation only by thereby failing to comply with another 
obligation.127 The MLI anticipates this issue in respect of the framework of compatibility clauses. 
Incompatibility exists when the two provisions being connected have opposite effects regarding a 
specific situation. In other words, if similar provisions in the MLI and the existing DTT are 
applicable simultaneously, they cannot be antagonistic to each other. As a result, one provision 
will have to prevail over the other.  
 
The Explanatory Statement declares that ‘an existing provision of a Covered Tax Agreement is 
considered ‘incompatible’ with a provision of the Convention if there is a conflict between the two 
provisions’.128 The Explanatory Statement gives an example of incompatibility with Article 17 on 
corresponding adjustments.129 The compatibility clause in Article 17(2) provides that this Art. will 
apply in place of or in absence of an existing provision that requires a Contracting State to make a 
corresponding adjustment if certain conditions are met. However, if the existing provision does 
not require a Contracting State to make a corresponding adjustment but instead allows discretion 
to perform it or not, then the existing provision will still be applicable unless it becomes 
incompatible with Art. 17 of the MLI. Incompatibility would arise if the existing provision 
permitted the Contracting State to neglect Art. 17 of the MLI even if the triggering conditions are 
fulfilled. In this situation, Art. 17 of the MLI would supersede the existing provision and replace 
it to the extent to avoid conflict between them. 
 
Therefore, it can be deduced that incompatibility may arise whenever a discretionary provision in 
the DTT counters a MLI provision with a strict application. The latter are easily recognized as they 
introduce new conditions that shall be applied.  For example, Art. 9 of the MLI presents an 
imperative testing period of 365 days to determine if the condition of the value threshold regarding 
capital gains or interest has been met. If the DTT provision disregards the testing period, both Arts. 
become incompatible and the MLI provision shall prevail.  
 
Outside of the interaction between treaties, users may raise the question on the possibility of 
incompatibility between domestic legislation and the DTT provision as modified by the MLI. With 
reference to the MLI provisions as anti-abuse rules incorporated to DTTs, their application should 
be complementary to any national General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAARs) and should precede 
domestic rules that may allow prominence of BEPS schemes. However, treaty overrides will occur 
as the level of commitment on the application of the MLI is not the same for every State. In this 
                                                          
127 International Law Commission of the United Nations (N 82) 19.  
128 OECD (N 15) 6. 
129 ibid, 7.  
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matter, States will need to rely on the improved Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) and the 
mandatory binding arbitration found in Article 16 and 18 of the MLI, respectively.  
 
5. A Reflection on the Need of Common Interpretation 
 
Throughout many years, the OECD and the UN have developed an international fiscal language 
which is reflected in the text of the worldwide DTT network. Tax treaties in general should be 
interpreted in a common way. Regarding DTTs, it is important that both parties interpret it in the 
same manner but it is almost as important that expressions frequently found in these conventions 
should have the same meaning.130 Uniform criteria between both Contracting States establishes a 
common interpretation of the text and leads to a consistent application of the norms in it.  
 
However, as Vogel and Prokisch argued in the 1993 IFA Cahiers, the practical problem of common 
interpretation is linked with the problem of information.131 Even in a globalized world, courts and 
authorities around the globe will not know of relevant decisions made in other States. Also, due to 
language barriers, a variety of translations would be needed to understand how countries are 
applying DTTs. To fix this issue, the constant consideration of model conventions and their 
commentaries as part of the context of the DTT or a supplementary means of interpretation has 
eased the decision-making process in countries like Belgium and Austria.132 
 
In the case of the MLI, there is also a need for common interpretation of its text as it modifies the 
DTTs. Nonetheless, as this instrument has not entered into force, a thorough analysis of the 
particular interpretation for each MLI provision cannot be made yet. Still, it is essential to establish 
a common ground in doctrine regarding the application of the MLI and its internal systems to 
achieve the coordinated interpretation of its provisions. It is critical to search for a common 
interpretation on two specific subjects: The interaction of the MLI’s text with the content of the 
DTTs and how the resulting modification should be read within the context of the MLI. As Reiner 
asserts, the requirement of common interpretation concerning international treaties derives from 
the fact that it is necessary to achieve their object and purpose.133  
 
Eventually, to solve any interpretation issue, consolidated or annotated texts for DTTs will be 
needed by the States. However, the lack of a mechanism in the MLI to produce these texts will 
conclude in the complexity of determining the precise wording change to a particular DTT 
according to the reservations formulated by the Contracting States and the compatibility clauses 
for each provision.134 If this situation triggers rounds of new, long-lasting bilateral negotiations to 
                                                          
130 John Prebble, 'Interpretation Of Double Taxation Conventions' (2015) 5 Victoria University of Wellington Legal 
Research Papers, 483.  
131 Klaus Vogel and Rainer Prokisch, 'Interpretation Of Double Taxation Conventions' [1993] IFA Cahiers, 64.  
132 See Michael Lang, Tax Treaty Interpretation (1st edn, Kluwer Law International 2002). 
133 Ekkehart Reimer, 'Interpretation Of Tax Treaties' (1999) 39 European Taxation, 458-474 
134 Hattingh (N 32) 5. 
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develop the actual textual changes to their DTTs, then it might have not been worth it to create 
such a complex instrument.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis aimed to determine how the interaction between the MLI and the existing DTTs will 
transform the text of the latter in order to dissipate new interpretative challenges. The author has 
analyzed this subject in two different parts: a) an overview of the MLI and its interpretation; and, 
b) an examination of its reservations and compatibility system. In this respect, the following 
concluding remarks can be drawn.  
 
The text of a treaty is the primary object of interpretation.135 The MLI, as a third layer of content, 
comes into play to alter the text of DTTs with new sets of taxation rules. Consequently, it will 
modify the way in which DTTs will be interpreted as users will have to take into consideration a 
new instrument with different provisions. Following Art. 31 of the VCLT, the MLI has to be 
interpreted in ‘good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its objective and purpose’. The Explanatory Statement and the 
BEPS Final Reports form part of this context while the implementation of tax treaty-related BEPS 
measures must be regarded as the object and purpose of the MLI. 
 
The implementation of BEPS measures requires a high level of commitment between the Signatory 
States of the MLI. For this reason, flexibility is an inherent trait of the MLI that provides certain 
freedom to the States on how to apply this multilateral agreement. This characteristic creates varied 
ranges of possibilities on the applicable content of the MLI and the wording of the existing DTTs, 
establishing unevenness in the tax treaty landscape. In the MLI, the main tools that achieve the 
flexibility needed to attract every country are the reservations system and the compatibility clauses. 
 
Whenever a Contracting State formulates a reservation in the MLI, there will be an effect on the 
wording of the modified provision in the DTT as a consequence of the legal effects of reservations 
in combination with the bilateral nature of DTTs. Congruent to the flexibility of the MLI, 
amendments enacted by reservations should be interpreted in a way that only the words in common 
between a reserving State and an accepting State provide modifications of their DTT. Formulated 
reservations will define the MLI provisions that will be taken into account in the use of 
compatibility clauses. 
 
The relationship between the MLI and DTTs is regulated by different types of compatibility 
clauses. In general, compatibility clauses in the MLI follow the spirit of the lex posterior principle 
as they establish that provisions in the MLI have primacy over those in the existing DTT. 
                                                          
135 Engelen (N 115) 417. 
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Compatibility clauses determine if the MLI provision annuls the clause in the DTT, overlaps on 
its text or changes the wording of the existing provision. However, their effectiveness depends on 
the identification of the affected provisions and its notification by the Contracting States.  
 
In the application of compatibility clauses, Contracting States should establish the consolidated 
text between the MLI and the existing DTT to prevent the user of the MLI from ignoring relevant 
text or adding excluded content to it. This consolidated text combines two different legal texts that 
should be interpreted simultaneously. As a result, the undefined terminology replacing the text in 
the existing DTT has to be given a meaning according to their respective renvoi clauses. 
 
 It is a fact that both instruments share most of their legal terms as they were developed in the 
international fiscal language. Nonetheless, as shown through the case of conflicts of qualification, 
the context in which a term is used in the MLI and the DTT may differ. When the text of a DTT 
as modified by the MLI is examined, it should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of 
the MLI. The ordinary meaning given to undefined terms in the MLI has to be in line with the 
context conceived by the BEPS Project. In summary, the author demonstrates how the MLI 
establishes new taxation rules and different context that brings out new ways of understanding the 
text of DTTs.  
 
With the culmination of this thesis, the author encourages tax experts to become more interested 
on the development of the MLI and its application. Also, as Douma states, the BEPS Project 
provides a unique opportunity for international tax lawyers to become more acquainted with 
international law as much can be learned from it.136 Most certainly, new international instruments 
will be developed by the OECD and the UN. If the MLI becomes a successful achievement, the 
trend of the internationalization of tax law will continue further and different unconventional 
interactions will arise to change the global tax treaty network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136 Sjoerd Douma, Legal Research In International And EU Tax Law (1st edn, Kluwer 2014), 15-16.  
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